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Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a
Response to Foreign Government Trade
Actions: When, Why, and How
by Shirley A. Coffield*
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 19741 is the primary U.S. statute
providing authority for the President to take action against unfair trade
practices of other governments which adversely affect U.S. commerce,
either in goods or services. For the most part, the implementation of the
statute has focused on attempts to eliminate the acts, practices, or poli-
cies of foreign governments that adversely affect U.S. exports. The stat-
ute is also used to combat violations of international agreements by
foreign governments which may affect imports into the United States as
well as exports, and it contains special provisions for the treatment of
violations of the MTN agreement on subsidies and countervailing
duties. 2
Section 301 is not a substitute for, nor an alternative to, other U.S.
statutes that address specific unfair trade practices, such as the anti-
dumping laws, 3 the 337 statute, 4 or, except under specifically provided
procedures, the countervailing duty statute.5 Unlike these statutes, a sec-
tion 301 proceeding is not an APA proceeding, and the flexibility pro-
vided the President and the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
makes it a more political statute. Section 301 was shaped quite deliber-
ately to give the Executive the tools to use diplomatic and economic pres-
sure to achieve a more "equitable" world trading system, to the benefit of
U.S. commerce.
* Partner, Reaves and Coffield, Washington, D.C.; Assistant General Counsel of the Of-
fice of the Special Trade Representative (now USTR) in the Executive Office of the President
and Chairman of the interagency Section 301 Committee, 1975-1979; B.A. 1967, Willamette
University; M.A. 1969, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1974, George Washington University
(with honors).
I Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(Supp. II1 1979)).
2 The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, reprintd in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, AGREE-
MENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Agreement on
GA M1.
3 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979).
4 Id. § 1337.
5 Id. § 1303.
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In its amended form, section 301 takes on an expanded and more
critical role as the primary statute to enforce U.S. rights under newly
negotiated trade agreements as well as under general GATT 6 provisions.
For this reason, the future use of section 301 will be an important indica-
tor of both the United States' commitment to the multilateral trade rules
and its ability to resolve trade disputes on a bilateral basis before resort-
ing to the more fragile multilateral mechanisms.
This article will examine the provisions of sections 301-306 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 7
The development of this trade action will be reviewed, and the mechan-
ics for a private petition will be outlined. Then, the article will describe
the petitioner's interface with the Office of the USTR as well as the fed-
eral government's roles and objectives. Throughout, practical advice on
sensitive areas of the process will be provided to enable the petitioner to
prepare a well-conceived strategy to achieve the desired results.
I. Background
While the roots of present section 301 may be found in much prior
federal legislation,8 the major provisions now present in the statute were
first incorporated into legislation in the Trade Act of 1974.9 That legisla-
tion gave the President broad authority to retaliate against unreasonable
and unjustifiable import restrictions of other countries that affect U.S.
commerce.
As enacted in 1975, section 301 allows the President to deny or mod-
ify the benefits of trade agreement concessions or to impose duties or
other import restrictions on the products and services of any country that
is found to be unjustifiably' ° or unreasonably I burdening or restricting
U.S. commerce. Congress gave administration of the procedures to the
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR). i2
The purpose of section 301 is quite clear: the United States is to use
this retaliatory authority vigorously as leverage to get other countries to
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Parts (5) and (6),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter cited as GA77].
7 Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144.
8 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (re-
pealed 1975).
9 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978.
10 "Unjustifiable" refers to restrictions which are illegal under international law or incon-
sistent with international obligations. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON TRADE RE-
FORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 163, repnrntedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS .7186, 7301 [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Report].
I I "Unreasonable" refers to restrictions which are not necessarily illegal but which nullify
or impair benefits accruing to the United States under trade agreements or which otherwise
discriminate against or burden U.S. commerce. Id
12 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 306, 88 Stat. 1978, as added by Pub. L. No. 96-
39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2416 (Supp. III 1979)).
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eliminate unfair trade practices that affect U.S. commerce,'3 including
both product exports and services. 14 The practices noted in the legisla-
tive history as unfair include discriminatory rules of origin, government
procurement, licensing systems, quotas, exchange controls, restrictive
business practices, discriminatory bilateral agreements, variable levies,
border tax adjustments, discriminatory road taxes, horsepower taxes,
other taxes which discriminate against imports, 15 certain product stan-
dards, and many other practices that were documented by the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission (USITC),' 6 and subsidies identified in
their principal forms by the Senate Finance Committee.17
The Congress felt in the early 1970's that the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provisions for dispute settlement and retalia-
tion rights had not been effective in preventing or eliminating barriers to
U.S. exports. In fact, many Congressmen believed that the decision-
making process in the GATT worked to the detriment of the United
States.' 8 Thus, in the Trade Act of 1974, Congress instructed the trade
negotiators in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) to seek
changes in those rules.' 9 Because of this low opinion of the GATT pro-
cess, the 1974 legislation made it clear that the President could take retal-
iatory action even in the absence of a GATT finding of a violation, and
that the U.S. action itself need not conform to the GATT provisions.20
Eighteen cases 2 ' were filed by petitioners and initiated by the STR
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 from January 1975 until the
passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 in July 1979. Of these, six
cases were referred by the United States to GATT working parties or
GATT panels for dispute settlement.2 2 Four were subject to consulta-
13 1974 Senate Report, supra note 10, at 31, 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7208-
09.
14 The term "U.S. commerce" includes U.S. services associated with international trade.
For example, the U.S. insurance industry, the air transport industry, banking industry, or
merchant shipping industry. Id at 165, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7303. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 122-129 infra.
15 1974 Senate Report, supra note 10, at 163-64, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7302.
16 U.S. INT'L TARIFF COMMISSION, TARIFF COMMISSION PUB. No. 665. TRADE BARRI-
ERS, pt. I1 (1974).
17 1974 Senate Report, note 10 supra.
18 Seegenerally 1974 Senate Report, note lOsupra. See also id at 5-15, 83-87,11974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7187-7197, 7232-7236.
19 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976)).
20 1974 Senate Report, supra note 10, at 166, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7304.
The Report noted that "[t]he Committee felt it was necessary to make it clear that the President
could act to protect U.S. economic interests whether or not such action was consistent with the
articles of an outmoded international agreement initiated by the Executive 25 years ago and
never approved by the Congress." Id
21 Cites to these cases throughout this article are to the complaints and termination notices
published in the Federal Register. More complete information can be obtained by consulting the
case files, which are open to public inspection at the Office of the USTR.
22 Exports of eggs to Canada, Office of the USTR Docket No. 301-2, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,749
(1975); Exports of certain fruits and vegetables to the European Community (EC), Docket No.
301-4, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,635 (1975); Exports of soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil to the EC,
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tions under Article XXII or XXIII of the GATT, 23 and eight cases were
never involved in the GATT process. 24 During that four and a half year
period, the United States took no retaliatory actions under section 301
and terminated only six cases through satisfactory bilateral resolution. 25
From the United States' point of view, the majority of these cases were
never satisfactorily resolved. Throughout this period, however, the Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations had a great impact on the actions taken
under section 301 as well as on the discussions and negotiations with
other countries regarding the practices complained of by U.S. petition-
ers.2 6 For this reason, one should not treat this period as indicative of the
success or failure of section 301 as a method for dealing with restrictive
actions of other nations.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 amended section 30127 to en-
courage the effective use of the new dispute settlement processes agreed
to in the MTN.28 The purposes of the amendments were to place time
constraints on the USTR and the President for making certain decisions
under section 301, to encourage responsible actions under 301, and to
Docket No. 301-8, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,384 (1976); Exports of thrown silk to Japan, Docket No. 301-
12, 42 Fed. Reg. 11,935 (1977); Exports of leather to Japan, Docket No. 301-13, 42 Fed. Reg.
42,413 (1977); Exports of cigar tobacco to Japan, Docket No. 301-17, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083
(1979).
23 EC subsidization of malt to third markets, Docket No. 301-5, 40 Fed. Reg. 54,311
(1975); EC subsidization of wheat flour exports to third markets, Docket No. 301-6, 40 Fed. Reg.
57,249 (1975); Exports of citrus to the EC, Docket No. 301-11, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,767 (1976);
Wheat shipped to third countries by the EC, Docket No. 301-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,935 (1978).
24 Guatemala cargo preferences, Docket No. 301-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,135 (1975); Exports of
egg albumen to the EC, Docket No. 301-3, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,649 (1975); Exports of canned fruit
to the EC, Docket No. 301-7, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,385 (1976); Exports of household appliances to the
Republic of China, Docket No. 301-9, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,452 (1976); Exports of steel between
Japan and the EC, Docket No. 301-10, 41 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1976); U.S.S.R. marine insurance
market, Docket No. 301-14, 43 Fed. Reg. 3,635 (1978); Canadian restrictions on U.S. television
licensees, Docket No. 301-15, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,617 (1978); Argentina marine insurance market,
Docket No. 301-18, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,057 (1979).
25 Guatemala cargo preferences, Notice of Termination, Docket No. 301-1, 41 Fed. Reg.
26,758 (1976); Exports of eggs to Canada, Notice of Termination, Docket No. 301-2, 41 Fed.
Reg. 9,430 (1976); Exports of certain fruits and vegetables to the EC, Notice of Termination,
Docket No. 301-4, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,504 (1979); Exports of soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean
oil to the EC, Notice of Termination, Docket No. 301-8, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,504 (1979); Exports of
household appliances to the Republic of China, Notice of Termination, Docket No. 301-9, 42
Fed. Reg. 61,103 (1977); Exports of thrown silk to Japan, Notice of Termination, Docket No.
301-12, 43 Fed. Reg. 8,876 (1978).
26 Many cases were discussed indirectly or directly in the context of the MTN and there-
fore no formal action was taken on these cases during that period. Very little was accomplished
in the MTN to solve the problems raised in many of the cases that were put on "hold," gener-
ally because most of those problems concerned the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC, a
sacrosanct, albeit costly, system in the EC which the United States was not willing to challenge
directly. Two of the pending active cases now being pursued through the GATT', however, are
old cases which involve elements of that system. See Docket No. 301-6, note 23 supra; Docket
No. 301-11, note 23 supra.
27 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, amended .y Trade Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144.
28 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1979, S. REP.
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 231-32, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE,CONG. & AD. NEWS 381,
617-18 [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Report].
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assure that the petitioner would be fully informed throughout this pro-
cess. 29 The new statute clearly reflects Congress' dissatisfaction with the
pace and degree of enthusiasm with which section 301 cases had been
pursued by the Office of the STR under the 1974 legislation. 30
I. Provisions of the Statute
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was substantially rewritten
and new sections 302 through 306 were added in the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979.31 Congress expanded the provisions of the 1974 Act creat-
ing new and more detailed procedural requirements and providing new
responsibilities for the USTR.32 The new Act reflects a change in the
Congressional attitude toward the GATT dispute settlement procedures,
with the caveat that the U.S. Government has a major responsibility to
see that the new provisions work to the benefit of the United States. The
Senate Report on the bill's provisions notes:
The changes made in the MTN with respect to dispute settlement proce-
dures offer possibilities of significantly improving the process and the
results of international dispute settlement with respect to international
trade issues. However, the results merely offer the possibility of improve-
ment. The U.S. Government must take responsible and forceful action
in the use of these procedures, and other countries must adhere to their
spirit as well as their letter, if in fact they are to be of benefit to the
United States and international trade.
33
Section 301 sets forth the conditions which would require the Presi-
dent to take action. Subsection (a) authorizes the President to take ac-
tion if he
determines that action by the United States is appropriate (1) to enforce
the rights of the United States under any trade agreement, or (2) to
respond to any act, policy or practice of a foreign country or instrumen-
tality that (A) is inconsistent with the provisions of or otherwise denies
benefits to the United States under any trade agreement, or (B) is unjus-
tifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce.
34
The provision authorizes the President to take all appropriate and feasi-
ble action within his power to enforce these rights or to obtain the elimi-
nation of the foreign practice, act or policy on either a non-
9 Id
30 For further explanation of Congress's reasons for changes in section 301, see general
1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 232-43, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 617-29.
31 Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144.
32 The name of the STR was changed in Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,173,
93 Stat. 1381, reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171 note (Supp. III 1979) and implemented in Exec.
Order No. 12188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1980), reprintedin 19 U.S.C. § 2171 note (Supp. III 1979) from
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to the United States Trade Representative.
33 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 234, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 620.
34 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (Supp. III 1979). The definition of "U.S. commerce" was also
changed in the 1979 Act. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, amended
by Trade Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(d)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
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discriminatory or discriminatory basis.3 5
Subsection (b)3 6 gives specific authorization for the President to
deny or modify the benefits of trade agreement concessions or to impose
duties or other import restrictions on the products of, or fees on the serv-
ices of, the foreign government.
Once a determination has been made to take action, subsection (c) 37
defines the Presidential procedures. The President may take action on
his own or in response to a petition filed by any interested party. If the
President is taking action under his own motion, he must publish his
determination and reasons in the Federal Register, and provide the oppor-
tunity for presentation of views before actually taking the action "unless
he determines that expeditious action is required. '38 If the determina-
tion results from a petition filed by an interested party, he must make his
decision on what action to take, if any, within twenty-one days of receiv-
ing a recommendation on the petition from the USTR. The President
must also publish this determination in the Federal Register.3 9
Any interested party may file a petition with the USTR, requesting
the President to take action under section 301 and "setting forth the alle-
gations in support of the request."' 4 Section 30241 sets forth the proce-
dures for the filing of the petition with the USTR and the
determinations by the USTR of whether to initiate an investigation.
This section provides time limits and notice requirements for these deter-
mination procedures, and will be discussed in Part IV.
When the petitioner's allegations involve an international trade
agreement, section 30342 requires consultation between the USTR and
the foreign country. If the parties reach no satisfactory resolution in the
consultation period, the USTR must request proceedings under the for-
mal dispute settlement procedures of the agreement. 43
Section 30444 sets forth the time limits for the USTR recommenda-
tions to the President. The time limits vary depending on the type of
complaint and are presented in detail in Part IV of this article.
Another new provision of section 304 requires the USTR to submit
a report to the Congress within fifteen days after the end of the minimum
dispute settlement period 45 in the affected agreement if the dispute were
35 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (Supp. III 1979). Subsection (a) authorizes action "on a nondis-
criminatory basis or solely against the products or services of the foreign country or instrumen-
tality involved."36 Id § 2411(b).
3 7 Id § 2411(c).
3a Id § 2411(c)(1).
39 Id § 2411(c)(2).
40 Id § 2412(a).
41 Id § 2412.
4 2 Id § 2413.
43 Id The "consultation period" is that specified in the trade agreement. Id
44 Id § 2414.
45 The minimum dispute settlement period is "the total period of time that results if all
stages of the formal dispute settlement procedures are carried out within the time limitation
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not resolved before the close of that minimum period. The report would
have to give the status of the dispute proceedings, the prospects for reso-
lution and any actions contemplated with respect to the dispute by the
Executive. 46
Section 304(b)47 continues the requirements in the old law that
there be a presentation of public views except in cases where expeditious
action is necessary. This provision also requires the USTR to obtain ad-
vice from appropriate private sector advisory representatives before mak-
ing recommendations to the President.
Section 30548 sets up a procedure whereby any person may request
from the USTR information on acts or practices of foreign governments
or instrumentalities with respect to particular merchandise, U.S. rights
under any trade agreement and remedies which might be available, and
past and present domestic and international proceedings or actions
which have been instituted or completed with respect to that practice or
policy.49 The USTR must provide any nonconfidential information; or,
if information is not available to the USTR or other federal agencies
through the USTR, he must request the information from foreign gov-
ernments; or, if the USTR declines to request that information, he must
inform the person requesting the information of the reasons that infor-
mation has not been requested or provided.50
Section 3065' provides for the administration of section 301. It in-
corporates procedures present in the old act, including a requirement for
regulations to be issued by USTR, the submitting of a report to the
House and Senate semi-annually on the pending petitions and their cur-
rent status, and a new obligation to keep the petitioner regularly informed
of all determinations and developments in his petition.5 2
Under the amended section 301, the President may take action on a
nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the products and services of the
foreign country which is found to be burdening or restricting U.S. com-
merce. 53 Congress repealed the override provision 54 on actions that are
specified in the agreement, but computed without regard to any extension authorized under the
agreement of any stage." Id § 2414(a)(3).
46 Id
47 I,. § 2414(b).
48 Id § 2415.
49 Id § 2415(a)(l)-(a)(3).
50 Id § 2415(b). The USTR must inform the petitioner or person requesting the informa-
tion of its reasons for refusing to request the information from the foreign government in writing
and within thirty days of the request. See a/so 15 C.F.R. § 2006.14 (1981). While not explicit in
the statute, the thirty day time limit logically would also apply to positive responses from the
USTR to the information seeker.
51 19 U.S.C. § 2416 (Supp. III 1979).
52 Id
53 Id. § 2411 (a).
54 Found in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 302, 88 Stat. 1978 (repealed
1979), this section provided for a Congressional override by vote of a simple majority of both
Houses if the President took action on a nondiscriminatory basis.
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taken on a nondiscriminatory basis because it felt that under the new
broadened and more detailed provisions of the amended act the provi-
sion was no longer necessary. 55 It is expected that actions will be on a
discriminatory basis since the action is taken in retaliation for an act of a
specific country.56
Il. When to Bring a Complaint
A. When a Section 301Action Would Be Appropriate
Any time a potential petitioner feels he has a problem exporting a
product to a foreign country, he should look at the provisions of section
301 through section 306 to see whether his concerns might be answered
through recourse to these statutory provisions. Frequently, a petitioner
will not know exactly what the practice is that is keeping his exports out
of a given country. In that case, he can take advantage of new section
305 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and require the USTR to re-
spond to requests for information about acts or practices of foreign gov-
ernments or instrumentalities with respect to particular merchandise or
services.5 7 Petitioners have not used this provision of the law to its fullest
extent to this point. Yet, it could be a more effective way for potential
petitioners to not only obtain information about the practices of the for-
eign government but also get an indication of the possible chances of
success of a formal section 301 complaint, should one be filed. Finally,
use of section 305 can serve both to warn the foreign government of a
potential 301 action and to alert the USTR of a problem that needs to be
examined and perhaps solved before the complaining party feels a need
to bring a formal 301 action.
Actions brought under section 301 in the past provide a good cross-
section of the types of foreign practices that might lead a U.S. complain-
ant to bring a formal action under section 301, or at least to make infor-
mal inquiries about the use of section 301 to solve a problem he might
have with the particular foreign practice, act or policy.
Some of these cases involve the services sector, such as discrimina-
tory cargo preference legislation and discriminatory insurance require-
ments of foreign governments, both in the shipping and nonshipping
areas. 58 Common complaints in product trade include practices such as
those of the European Economic Community affecting U.S. agricultural
5 See generally 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 236, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 621.
56 See generally id at 235, [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 621. Also, the GATT
would only authorize country-specific retaliation in GATT cases of this type, a violation of an
agreement by a specific country.
57 19 U.S.C. § 2415 (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra.8 See, e.g., Docket No. 301-1, note 24 supra; Docket No. 301-14, note 22 supra; Docket No.
301-18, note 24 supra.
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exports: internal use regulations, 59 "minimum-import prices,"'60 third-
country subsidization 6 1 (which adversely affects U.S. exporters in third-
country markets), excessively high tariffs, and import and customs regu-
lations. Other common complaints by both manufacturing industries
and agricultural producers include import formalities, advertising and
marketing restrictions, and numerous other practices that violate, or ap-
pear to violate, national treatment provisions of international
agreements. 62
B. Informal Complaints versus Formal Filings
In many cases, more can be accomplished through the threat of
filing a 301 complaint than might be accomplished through the actual
filing of a complaint. This depends on the foreign government involved
and the particular act or practice in question. Some governments, faced
with a formal, public section 301 complaint, will become difficult to deal
with or completely intransigent to show that it is not being "bullied"
around by the U.S. Government. In many cases, though, an informal
private discussion by the USTR with the foreign government, with either
the implicit or the explicit threat of a formal public complaint, might
lead to a satisfactory resolution of the complaint. This approach may
work, however, only in those cases where the foreign government feels it
has some flexibility to change the act, practice or policy which is the
subject of the complaint. Where a foreign government's trade policies
may be difficult to change because they reflect domestic concerns in that
country and pressures for protection of certain producers or industries,
an informal and fairly substantial process between governments might
drag on for some time.63 The petitioner may finally have to file a formal
complaint to show the "seriousness" of his concerns and to make sure
that the USTR in fact is doing everything necessary to resolve a legiti-
mate concern of the complainant.
In other cases, the proper approach may be to immediately bring a
formal complaint and to press it vigorously with the hope that the for-
eign government, to avoid retaliatory action, will in fact respond by
changing the act, practice or policy. Setting forth criteria under which
each of these tactics should be used is difficult, but a careful study of the
59 An "internal use" regulation is the requirement of the use of domestic products in, for
example, grain mixtures.
60 "Minimum import prices" involve the assessment of an additional payment on imports
that enter below a set minimum price.
61 For example, the European Community subsidizes wheat flour exports to markets in
which nonsubsidized U.S. wheat is also competing. See, e.g., EC subsidization of wheat flour
exports to third world markets, Docket No. 301-6, note 26 supra.
62 See, e.g., Docket No. 301-12, note 22 supra; and Docket No. 301-17, note 22supra, which
detail extensive Japanese nontariff barriers.
63 Cases involving Japan are good examples, such as Docket No. 301-10, note 24 supra;
Docket No. 301-12, note 22 supra; Docket No. 301-17, note 22 supra.
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particular complaint and the particular country involved will be impor-
tant in determining how best to bring an effective 301 case.
C Political Considerations
The political considerations in bringing a 301 action are both do-
mestic and international. Frequently, the domestic producer or industry
bringing a complaint against a foreign government will expect the
wholehearted support of interested Congressmen and at least some U.S.
agencies. However, international political considerations, which the
USTR and other Executive Branch agencies must take into account,
may convince a potential petitioner that a section 301 complaint will not
produce the desired results. One obvious example would be bringing a
301 action against a country in a sensitive political situation when, for
valid foreign policy considerations, the Administration is not willing to
take action against that nation at that particular time.
While theoretically the economic considerations of section 301
should be separate from those foreign policy considerations, in reality
they are not separate, and indeed cannot be made so. Petitioners should
be aware of this when preparing to bring a case under section 301. In
many of these situations, however, an informal approach to the USTR
may prompt the U.S. Government to make informal approaches to the
other government in hopes that a potentially difficult case can be re-
solved before it becomes public. Similarly, the U.S. Government may be
able to use the "threat" of a 301 petition as leverage to get a foreign
government to change a practice which the U.S. Government itself has
not been successful in getting removed through purely diplomatic
means.
64
Another consideration in bringing a section 301 action is to consider
the actual effect and impact of the foreign act, practice, or policy on do-
mestic producers or manufacturers. Unfortunately, some cases brought
in the past under section 301 have been geared to "principle" rather than
to actual significant or even moderate damage to U.S. exporters.65 These
particular cases are very difficult, if not impossible, to resolve success-
fully. In the international framework, getting the GATT to take action
is difficult if the complaining country is not able to show anything more
than negligible impact on its exporters. 66 Those types of cases also
weaken the credibility of the U.S. Government's threats to take retalia-
64 A difficult problem of hide export embargoes by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay was
resolved by agreements negotiated before cases had to be filed.
65 For example, in Docket No. 301-16, note 23 supra, concerning wheat exports, the U.S.
industry was thriving and exports had increased significantly. In Docket No. 301-3, note 24
supra, concerning the EC variable levy on egg albumen, no measurable damage was demon-
strated. The U.S. Government eventually terminated both cases.
66 See, e.g., Docket No. 301-2, note 22 supra, involving exports of eggs to Canada. The
United States was unable in the GAIT working party to show anything other than minimal
trade impact.
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tory action against exports of the allegedly sinful foreign country. While
many countries have policies on the books that in fact would be quite
detrimental to U.S. exports, unless a petitioner can show a real connec-
tion with his own exports or real export potential, he should not bring
the case.
IV. How to Bring a Section 301 Action
Whether filing a formal petition immediately or making an informal
complaint, the first thing any potential petitioner should do is contact
the USTR's office and speak to the Chairman of the Section 301 Com-
mittee about the case. This initial contact will be helpful not only to the
potential petitioner but also to the USTR who may be able to get the
foreign country to take some action alleviating the problem before a for-
mal complaint is filed. The Chairman of the Section 301 Committee
should be helpful, depending upon who holds that position. Also, the
petitioner should send a draft of his petition to the Section 301 Chairman
before making a formal filing to make sure it conforms to both the proce-
dural regulations and the substantive criteria of the law.
A. Regulations and Procedures for Filing a Complaint
A petitioner may find the "Procedures for Complaints Received
Pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act," as amended in Title 15 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. 67 Under these regulations, petitions may
be submitted by any interested party, which is defined as a party who
has a significant interest,
for example, a producer or a commercial importer or exporter, of a prod-
uct which is affected either by the failure to grant rights to the United
States under a trade agreement or by the act, policy or practice com-
plained of; a trade association, a certified union or recognized union or
group of workers which is representative of an industry engaged in the
manufacture, production or wholesale distribution in the United States
of a product so affected; or any person representing a significant eco-
nomic interest affected by the act, practice or policy complained of.68
The petition must be submitted in twenty copies6 9 and should con-
tain the following information: (1) identification of the petitioner whose
interest is affected; (2) identification of the rights of the United States
being affected by the foreign government, with particular reference to
that part of 301 considered relevant; (3) copies of the laws or regulations
of the foreign government which is the subject of the petition; if copies
are not available, the laws and regulations should be identified with as
much detail as possible; (4) the identity of the foreign country which is
the subject of the complaint; (5) identification of the product or service
affected by the complained of act, policy or practice; (6) information on
67 15 C.F.R. § 2006 (1981).
68 Id § 2006.0(b).
69 Id § 2006.0(c).
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the complained of act, policy or practice-that is, information showing
how the restriction, act, policy, or practice violates or denies a U.S. right
under a trade agreement or otherwise discriminates against, burdens, or
restricts U.S. commerce, including specific information on volume of
trade and the impact on the petitioner and on U.S. commerce; and
(7) an indication of any other forms of relief sought by the complainant
under any act. 70
Petitioner must supply additional information if the assertion is that
subsidy payments are having an adverse effect on sales of the U.S. prod-
uct, either in U.S. or third-country markets. The required information
includes the volume of trade in the goods or services involved, an esti-
mate of the amount of the economic or other impact on petitioner and
U.S. commerce, and a statement of the particular manner in which the
subsidy is inconsistent with the trade agreement and burdens or restricts
U.S. commerce. 71
B. USTR Procedure for Handling a Complaint
Recognizing that some information may be difficult or impossible to
obtain, the Chairman of the Section 301 Committee may accept peti-
tions with less than complete information or may return the petition and
offer assistance to make the petition conform to the above require-
ments. 72 Once the USTR receives a petition, he notifies the foreign gov-
ernment or instrumentality of the petition and may request information
from that foreign government on the complained of act, practice or pol-
icy. If the information is not provided by the foreign government, the
USTR may proceed on the basis of the best information available. 73
Once a petition has been filed, the USTR has forty-five days to de-
termine whether to initiate an investigation. 74 During this time the Sec-
tion 301 Committee will look at the jurisdictional issues, determine
whether the petition conforms with procedural requirements, and deter-
mine whether the petition demonstrates a basis for substantive complaint
under section 301. If the USTR determines not to initiate, he must no-
tify the petitioner and publish the notice of the negative determination
and a summary of the reasons in the Federal Register.75 If the USTR de-
cides to initiate the investigation, he must publish the text of the petition
in the Federal Register and provide for a presentation of views, including
the opportunity for a public hearing, on the issue. 76
Once the USTR has decided to initiate an investigation, he will re-
quest consultations with the foreign government regarding the issues in
70 Id § 2006.1.
71 Id § 2006.i1(.
72 Id § 2006.2.
73 Id § 2006.4.
74 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (Supp. I1 1979).
75 Id. § 2412(b)(1).
76 Id § 2412(b)(2).
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the petition.7 7 If the particular complained of act, practice, or policy is
the subject of a trade agreement between the two countries and the con-
sultation does not lead to a satisfactory resolution, the USTR must insti-
tute formal international dispute settlement proceedings, 78 if any exist
under the agreement. At the same time, the USTR must seek informa-
tion and advice from the petitioner and from other private sector advi-
sors during the course of these consultations and dispute settlement
proceedings. 79 Congress felt this last provision was especially important
to insure private sector involvement at all stages.8 0
The requirement for seeking advice also applies to the domestic pro-
ceedings at the office of the USTR. Prior to making recommendations to
the President for action under this statute, section 303 requires the
USTR to obtain advice from appropriate private sector advisory repre-
sentatives. 8' In the case when expeditious action is required, that advice
must be sought after the recommendation is made. 2 The USTR may
also, at his discretion, seek the advice of the USITC on the probable
economic impact of the proposed action.
8 3
At the request of the petitioner, the Section 301 Committee will
hold public hearings as soon as possible, generally within 30 days of the
initiation of the investigation.8 4 Petitioner should include the request in
the complaint but may submit it later if timely.8 5 The Committee must
announce the public hearing in the Federal Register,8 6 and interested per-
sons must submit a written brief before the closing date announced in
that public notice.8 7 The brief may stand on its own or may be supple-
mented by oral testimony at the public hearing. After the public hear-
ing, the Committee will allow a period of time, usually ten to fifteen
days, for submitting rebuttal briefs.88 Petitioners should limit rebuttal
briefs to demonstrating errors of fact or analysis not pointed out in the
briefs or in the hearing testimony. 9 For reasons of "equity and the pub-
lic interests," the USTR or the Chairman of the Section 301 Committee
may waive any of the requirements discussed thus far.90
C Time Requirementsfor Recommendationsfom the USTR
After receiving the advice of the 301 Committee through the trade
77 Id § 2413.
78 Id
79 Id
80 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 239, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG' & AD. NEWS at 625.
81 15 C.F.R. § 2006.11 (1981).
82 Id
83 Id
84 Id § 2006.7(a).
85 Id § 2006.7(a)(3).
86 Id § 2006.7(d).
87 Id § 2006.8(a).
88 Id
89 I. § 2006.8(b).
90 Id §2006.10.
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policy structure and advice from appropriate private sector advisors, the
USTR recommends to the President what action, if any, should be taken
in a particular case under section 301. 9 1 The time for the recommenda-
tion varies depending upon the issues raised in the complaint. For peti-
tions alleging export subsidies covered by the International Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties,92 the recommendation must be
made within seven months after the initiation of the investigation. 93 If
the petition alleges any matter other than an export subsidy under the
above-named agreement, the time limit is eight months. 94
If the petition involves other trade agreements reached in the MTN
and approved by the Congress, 95 a recommendation must be made thirty
days after the dispute settlement procedure of such agreement is con-
cluded.96 Or, finally, if the case does not fall under one of the above
categories, a recommendation must be made within twelve months of the
date of the initiation of the investigation. 9 7 The President then has
twenty-one days to determine what, if any, action to take.98
V. Alternative Actions Under Section 301
A. Retahatog
, 
Actions
Hearings held under section 30499 prior to the actual recommenda-
tion of what U.S. action to take against a country will probably involve a
number of different interests. If the USTR is considering the recommen-
dation of retaliatory action against the products or services of that other
country, importers and users of those products in the United States and
those with an interest in or affected by the service involved, in all
probability, will complain, first, about the action being taken against this
country in general, and second, more specifically about the product or
service of interest to them being included on the list of possible retalia-
tory actions. When this point in the case is reached, therefore, the peti-
tioner should have a succinct but potent list of products or services that is
91 Id § 2006.12.
92 See Agreement on GA 7T, note 2 supra.
93 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
94 Id § 2414(a)(l)(B).
95 See id § 2503(a).
96 Id § 2414(a)(1)(C).
97 Id § 2414(a)(1)(D).
98 Id § 2411 (c)(2). Congress provided special rules for ongoing investigations of nontrade
agreement countries which then signed onto a trade agreement. (1) Those investigations pend-
ing at the time Congress passed the 1979 Act were considered as having been initiated on the
date of enactment of the bill. (2) Those investigations initiated at the time of enactment (as in
(1) above or after enactment but before a country has signed onto a particular code under the
MTN) are subject to the 12-month time limit. (3) If a country that is the subject of an allega-
tion enters into an agreement before the 12-month period expires, then the time limits would
run as if the complaint had been initiated when the agreement went into force with respect to
the foreign country concerned. Under these provisions, any previous consultation would, of
course, carry over and would not have to be redone. Id § 2414(a)(2).
99 Id § 2414.
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aimed at hurting the exports of the foreign country in question but
which will cause the least amount of negative political or economic pres-
sure in the United States.
To date, the United States has never taken any final retaliatory ac-
tion under section 301 against any foreign government whose acts, prac-
tices, or policies have been the subject of a formal section 301 complaint.
However, a number of sufficiently close calls give some guidance as to
how the system would work. Three cases published in the Federal Register
have made determinations of action and a list of possible items of exports
from the foreign country that would be subject to retaliatory trade re-
stricting actions by the U.S. Government should the act, practice, or pol-
icy not be significantly modified or eliminated. 00
While the most logical type of retaliation would be on the products
of the other country, section 301 authorizes other sanctions, such as the
imposition of fees on the services of other countries or any actions which
the President could take under any authority available to him to affect
the errant country.' 0 ' Generally, the view among policymakers has been
that the punishment should fit the crime where possible, and if the act,
practice, or policy which has been determined to be unjustified or unrea-
sonable is in the product area, the retaliation should also be in the prod-
uct area. Likewise, if the-act, practice, or policy is in the service area, the
retaliation should be in the service area. 10 2 Of course, taking action
against the foreign country has always been the least preferred solution
under section 301. The purpose of 301 is to lower the trade barrier of the
other country, not to raise another trade barrier in the United States.
Thus, the USTR has used section 301 and threats of action thereunder
most effectively as leverage to get some movement from the other govern-
ment on reducing its trade restricting actions.
B. Termination or Suspension
Another action the United States can take under section 301 is the
termination or suspension of a section 301 investigation. 0 3 A termina-
tion would follow a decision by the Section 301 Committee that the alle-
gations in the petition were not substantiated by the investigation. On
the other hand a suspension might well follow a tentative agreement
with the foreign government that would lead to a partial or future reduc-
100 Docket No. 301-13, 44 Fed. Reg. 3,580, 10,803, 13,067 (1979), Japanese restrictions on
U.S. leather exports; Docket No. 301-15, 45 Fed. Reg. 42,107 (1980), Canadian tax practices
denying benefit to Canadian advertisers using U.S. stations; Docket No. 301-20, 45 Fed. Reg.
78,850 (1980), Korean insurance practices.
101 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (Supp. III 1979).
102 This is a generally held view among international trade policy makers both in the
United States and abroad. It also has practical advantages since services are not covered by the
GATT, and therefore retaliation in the service area would not involve GATT scrutiny. Like-
wise, to take an action against a product in retaliation for a service area practice would violate
the GATI . See G4 7T, supra note 6, at art. VI § 5.
103 15 C.F.R. § 2006.6 (1981).
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tion of the trade restricting actions of the other government. Techni-
cally, the suspension would keep section 301 in effect, as leverage to
assure that the agreement is carried out. Terminations or suspensions
must be communicated to the complainant and be published in the Fed-
eral Register with a statement of reasons. 104
VI. Petitioner and the Government
A. The Interagency Trade Policy Mechanism which Develops
Recommendations to be Submitted to the USTR
As is the case in other trade policy decisions in the federal govern-
ment, the USTR is the coordinator and major policy director with re-
spect to decisions under section 301.105 However, certain decisions and
recommendations are formulated first by an interagency task force-in
this case, the Section 301 Committee chaired by an official from
USTR-and are approved by the statutorily created trade policy struc-
ture 0 6 before going to the USTR and through him to the President.
All parties should' always keep in mind that in most cases the Com-
mittee will arrive at its decision by consensus among the various inter-
ested departments and agencies, with some having more influence and
interest than others, depending upon the particular issue in the peti-
tioner's complaint. The major agencies and departments involved in this
process by Executive Order'0 7 include the USTR, the Departments of
State, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Justice, Treasury, Interior, Trans-
portation, Defense, and Energy, the Council of Economic Advisers, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council.
A representative of the International Trade Commission also sits as ex
oficio member of all staff level trade committees. In each department or
agency, one or a few people are assigned to make departmental or agency
recommendations on section 301 petitions; usually many of the same
people will be members of the Section 301 Committee for several differ-
ent cases. At the same time, experts from particular departments may be
called upon to handle any technical matters for a particular case. '0 8 De-
pending on its structure and the sensitivity of the case, White House offi-
cials at any or all levels of the decision-making process may be involved.
The Section 301 Committee will have several meetings throughout
the course of its investigation, and if a consensus is reached among the
104 Id
105 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
106 19 U.S.C. § 1872 (Supp. 11 1979).
107 Exec. Order No. 11846, 3 C.F.R. 971 (1971-1975 Compilation), repn'nted n 19 U.S.C.
§ 2111 note (Supp. III 1979), amendedby Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,173, 93 Stat.
1381, reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171 note (Supp. III 1979),andamendedby Exec. Order No. 12188, 3
C.F.R. 131 (1980), repnintedin 19 U.S.C. § 2171 note (Supp. III 1979).
108 For example, staff members from the Maritime Administration have provided technical
help on marine cases. See Docket No. 301-1, note 24 supra; Docket No. 301-14, note 24 supra;
Docket No. 301-18, note 24 s.upra.
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agencies, the recommendation will go forward without too much further
input from higher policy and political levels. However, if there is disa-
greement among the agencies, particularly if a major agency does not
agree with recommendations that other agencies are putting forward, the
matter will likely be elevated by the Chairman to a higher level in the
trade policy structure, perhaps the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in
the different agencies or departments. The case will get added attention
from the senior levels in the Office of the Trade Representative and pos-
sibly from the USTR himself. In addition, cases involving the European
Community and Japan usually generate senior level attention for both
economic and political reasons. Cases involving large volumes of trade
or particularly sensitive political or economic issues also will receive more
and higher level attention.
The investigation itself should be thorough and extensive. While
the unamended law did not clearly spell out the degree of investigation,
the Congress was careful to make the point in the 1979 amendments that
the investigation should cover all relevant issues, whether or not they all
were contained in the petition.10 9 The Senate Report notes:
In Investigations instituted under new section 302, it is expected that the
scope of the investigation will comprehend all issues fairly raised by the
allegations in the petition, and not be narrowly focused only on the ac-
curacy of the allegations. What is instituted is an investigation, so that
the [USTR] is expected to actively seek information on the issues raised
and not passively await the provision of information to it. In this re-
spect, the [USTR] should be able to request assistance of other agencies
in investigating or. pursuing a petition, and such assistance should be
forthcoming. 10t
Before sending recommendations to the President or taking interme-
diate action, the higher policy levels in the Department and in the
USTR must ratify any decisions to initiate dispute settlement mecha-
nisms in the international forum or to make initial public determinations
that may lead to retaliatory action. I Intermediate action, short of a
recommended retaliatory action, might include a decision to go forward
in dispute settlement in the international forum, tactics for that process,
initiation of consultations with foreign governments, or a major jurisdic-
tional or substantive determination on the merits of the petition.' 2
Given the time limits under the new Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
this process has become far more regularized than it was in the past, and
parties in any case should have a more accurate reading of the status of a
particular complaint at any moment in the process.
109 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 238, (1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 624.
110 Id at 238-39, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 624.
t11 See generally Exec. Order No. 11846, note 107 supra.
112 Internal USTR and agency practice is to handle all cases in this manner.
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B. Contacts
A petitioner and other interested parties on both sides should know
who is on the Section 301 Committee for his case. He should be sure that
those persons are completely aware of his position and have adequate
information on which to base recommendations for the agency or depart-
mental position. The most help an interested party can give is to provide
as much information as possible and to be as helpful as possible to the
members of the Section 301 Committee. At the same time, active inter-
est by the petitioner demonstrates to Committee members the seriousness
with which the petitioner considers his particular complaint and makes it
more difficult for the Committee to not vigorously investigate the partic-
ular complaint at issue. Likewise, active interest by those opposed to a
petition is crucial.
Naturally, the most important individual is the Section 301 Chair-
man 11 3 who will be on the staff of the USTR. He will have the most
influence over the Committee with respect to policy direction, both sub-
stantively and procedurally, on any particular case. The Chairman of
the Committee and representatives of all sides of the case should be in
frequent and close contact with each other throughout the Section 301
process.
C Other People with Whom Contact Should be Made
Even in the early stages of the investigation, interested parties
should also be in contact with the sub-cabinet, political and substantive
decision makers in the foreign trade and economics area who will have
the final say with respect to action on the petition. They should also be
in touch with appropriate congressional committee members, the Ways
and Means and Finance Committees, and possibly other substantive
committees, for example, Agriculture, if the issue is an agricultural one.
The purpose of this contact will be to keep the congressional staff and
members informed and interested in the petition. From the petitioner's
standpoint, such contacts should also assure that proper pressure is
placed on the USTR to follow through vigorously on the complaint in
the petition. Likewise, petitioner should be in touch with interest groups
that would have an interest in the case or in similar cases. Frequently,
the complained of act, practice, or policy may affect other products or
services not necessarily the particular concern of the petitioner but which
may be of great concern to a number of other people who have not peti-
tioned under section 301.114
113 The present chairperson of the Section 301 Committee is Jeanne Archibald, Esq., Office
of the General Counsel, Office of the USTR. All chairpersons are appointed by the general
counsel at the office of the USTR.
114 For example, Japanese nontariff barriers such as licensing and other import formalities
affect more imports than just tobacco, leather, and thrown silk, the subjects of Docket Nos. 301-
17, 301-13, and 301-12, respectively, note 22 supra.
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Depending upon the case, the country, and the issues involved, a
private petitioner should be in contact with the foreign government it-
self. While in some cases this would be appropriate, in others it would
not. The foreign government may seek out and welcome private contacts
with a petitioner, or it might be offended by such an approach.
VIl. What to Expect from Section 301
As noted previously, no 301 case to date has led to retaliation by the
U.S. Government against the complained of act, practice, or policy of the
foreign government. Nor have several of the cases been resolved success-
fully or even partially successfully from the point of view of the peti-
tioner. Many cases ended with a partial action on the part of the foreign
government,' 15 were terminated because of the de minimis nature of the
harm suffered,116 or were rather unsatisfactorily resolved through the
GATT dispute settlement mechanism.' 17
Thus, a petitioner should not get his expectations too high and come
to believe that the complained of action of the other government will be
completely eliminated or eliminated in a hurry. At best, these negotia-
tions are long and drawn out and require a great deal of compromise on
all sides. Also, in many instances the act, practice, or policy of the for-
eign government is politically sensitive and, hence, very difficult to
change publicly. If the U.S. position is also a politically sensitive one, the
result might be a complete deadlock. In those cases, it is important to
realize that the USTR considers retaliation a tool of very last resort. The
U.S. Government, if following past practice, will go to great lengths to
avoid taking action against the foreign country, instead preferring to ex-
ert the maximum pressure to get some movement towards a reduction in
the complained of act, practice, or policy.
Even given that pessimistic assessment, however, the petitioner, if he
is persistent, should be able to obtain some benefit from the 301 process.
Of course, the level of the benefit will vary from case to case, but in some
cases the resolution may be completely satisfactory if the petitioner is
willing to accept less than he perhaps first requested. In this regard, the
question "What do you want?" is one that petitioner should ask and an-
swer, not only at the very beginning of the 301 process but also at several
different critical stages throughout the process.
At the beginning of the 301 process, the petitioner should have
clearly in mind what action on the part of the other government will be
necessary to remove the obstacle to petitioner's trade in the product or
service. Throughout the investigative process and throughout the negoti-
ation and consultation process, the question should repeatedly be asked:
115 Se, e.g., Docket No. 301-12, note 25 supra.
116 See, e.g., Docket No. 301-3, note 24 supra, Notice of Termination, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,758
(1980).
117 See, e.g., Docket No. 301-4, note 25 supra.
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How much can the petitioner compromise and still make the effort
worthwhile? For example, in a product trade area, how much will the
petitioner settle for in the way of export to the particular country? In
many of these cases, the solution comes down to numbers and amounts of
money involved in the trade that is the subject of the complaint.
A "final" solution may be presented to the petitioner for comment.
Petitioner needs to examine realistically what he is getting as contrasted
to what he started out requesting at the beginning of the process, and, in
hard economic terms, what the action will accomplish. Section 301 cases
are not, nor should they be, simply exercises in philosophical disagree-
ment on different trade policies. The bottom line on any of these cases is
the economic benefit gained or lost by the particular trade actions of the
other country and, likewise, the action taken by the U.S. Government in
support of the petitioner.
All through the process, the interested parties should keep the differ-
ent interest groups and the congressional contacts that have been "lob-
bied" on this issue informed and in some cases even bring them into the
process of decision-making about the "final" acceptable compromise or
other resolution of the case. The extra leverage of congressional pressure
and pressure from other interest groups will help greatly in stiffening the
spine of U.S. Government officials who, in the final analysis, are going to
be the ones to decide the resolution of any particular case. While many
other considerations will come into play, including foreign policy, mili-
tary, and international political considerations, clearly the largest factor
in a decision should be, and in most instances can be, the merits of the
case as demonstrated by petitioner and other interested persons. The
more active and responsible the interjections by the petitioner and other
interested persons, the more likely the resolution of the case will be
favorable to the petitioner.
A. International Dispute Settlement
Most cases under 301 that involve product trade may end up in the
GATT, either in bilateral GATT Articles XXII or XXIII consultations
or in the formal dispute settlement panel mechanism of GATT Article
XXIII.11 8 The formal dispute settlement panel mechanism varies
slightly under the new MTN trade agreements, depending upon the par-
ticular issue in dispute, but the general outline of the mechanism is the
same as it has been since the GATT was founded in 1947.'"9 At the
request of the complaining country, the GATT will establish a panel of
objective experts, generally drawn from government representatives in
Geneva not acting on behalf of their governments, who will investigate
the complaint and report its findings and recommendations to the Con-
118 G477.; supra note 6, at arts. XXII and XXIII.
119 Id art. XXIII.
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tracting Parties of the GATT.' 20 The recommendations may include the
authorization of sanctions against an errant country not following the
recommendations of the Contracting Parties. In the past this process has
had its ups and downs. In the early years, the process was perhaps more
legalistically acceptable to the U.S. than it has become in later years.
Under the expanded and clarified rules of the MTN, it is hoped that the
orderliness and timeliness of these dispute settlement procedures will be-
gin working more to the benefit of those countries bringing complaints to
the GATT, including the United States. However, the GATT is an or-
ganization that runs on consensus and there will never be the kind of
certainty of right and wrong or justice and injustice as one would expect
in the U.S. court system. Likewise, the political and economic relation-
ships and situations among countries weigh heavily, not only on GAIT
panel members but also on the Contracting Parties when making deci-
sions about any particular complaint. For that reason, frivolous cases
should be kept out of the GATT process to the extent possible. Neither
an independent panel of experts nor the Contracting Parties like to make
adverse statements about another Contracting Party when the complaint
does not involve recognizable economic harm.
All through the GATT dispute settlement process, which is limited
to representatives of governments, the petitioner should be kept informed
by government representatives and should also be providing information
and help to the U.S. officials presenting the case. Under the new law, the
USTR has a greater obligation to take cases involving disputes under the
GATT rules through the GATT dispute settlement mechanism if bilat-
eral consultations are not successful. Therefore, the petitioner has an
even greater responsibility, as does the U.S. Government, to insure that
the cases are well prepared, involve significant issues of dispute that re-
sult in economic harm and, once they are begun, are followed through
vigorously and responsibly, not only in the international forum but in
the internal U.S. forum as well.
VIII. Defending a Section 301 Case
The defense of section 301 petitions varies with the country and the
issue involved. Since the complaint is brought against a foreign govern-
ment's actions, the foreign government may or may not acknowledge the
legitimacy of section 301 for that purpose and, for example, may or may
not hire counsel to make representations to the USTR and other agen-
cies. More frequently, governments will make representations directly,
through diplomatic channels. Some governments also reinforce these
contacts with private representations to the USTR office or even, in some
cases, the appearance of counsel at a public hearing.
The first objective of the foreign government is to demonstrate that
120 Id.
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the act, practice, or policy is not in violation of any international or bilat-
eral agreement or is not otherwise burdening or restricting U.S. com-
merce. Failing that, the government may try to negotiate the minimum
change necessary to get the petition withdrawn or terminated. Much of
these discussions will be formal and informal consultations and negotia-
tions between governments. The foreign government always is more
likely to get more private sector U.S. support for its position if a retalia-
tion list is published. Then, the respondent can appeal to those who
would be hurt by limits or duty increases on the foreign products or by
fees added onto foreign services in the United States. If the USTR holds
hearings on the proposed action, the majority of witnesses most likely will
be those opposed to the action for economic reasons.
IX. Unsettled Issues
A. Jurisdiction: "US Commerce"
Questions about what acts, practices, or policies of foreign govern-
ments are within the framework of section 301 have been raised since the
1974 Act and continue to be raised even though clarifications were made
in the 1979 Act. The issues revolve around the definition of "U.S. com-
merce." Under section 301, the act, practice, or policy of the foreign
government must be one that discriminates against or burdens U.S. com-
merce. 12 ' The 1974 Act defined "U.S. commerce" as not only product
trade but also U.S. services associated with international trade, such as
actions affecting the U.S. insurance industry, air transport industry,
banking industry, or merchant shipping industry.' 2 2 However, this defi-
nition created problems; for example, some interpretations 23 were at-
tempted that would narrow the definition to U.S. service industries
associated with product trade. In the 1979 Act, Congress clarified the
definition to include, but not be limited to, services associated with inter-
national trade whether or not such services are related to specific
products. ' 24
Congress added this provision specifically to take care of a problem
that had arisen in the Canadian Broadcasting case, 125 when representa-
tives of Canadian interests maintained that the complained of tax law
was not within the framework of section 301. To clarify that problem
and other potential problems, the Senate Finance Committee clearly
121 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
122 See note 14 supra.
123 For example, a narrow definition of "U.S. commerce" was attempted by some agencies
in the U.S. Government and by those interests (Canadian) adverse to the petitioner in Docket
No. 301-15 note 24 supra. This action involved Canadian tax treatment of cross border advertis-
ing by Canadians on U.S. television stations. The allegation was made that a television signal
was not a service associated with a product in foreign commerce and therefore was not covered
by section 301. Partly because of this allegation, the law was clarified in the 1979 Act to assure
that "commerce" would not be so narrowly defined. See text accompanying note 124 infta.
124 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 236, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 622.
125 Docket No. 301-15, note 24 supra.
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noted that, "What is comprehended in the term commerce includes in-
ternational trade and services as, for example, the provision of broadcast-
ing, banking and insurance services across national boundaries."'' 26
Even with these clarifications, significant problems in determining
where to draw the line between a trade related and an investment related
problem in a foreign country still persist. Even in those cases that might
seem quite clear, such as the Korean insurance case, 127 persons in the
Administration who might not want to pursue a section 301 action have
raised questions about the jurisdiction of section 301, claiming in that
particular case, for example, that the insurance question in Korea was
one of a "right of establishment" and therefore an investment issue
rather than one of those trade issues intended to be covered by section
301. However, because the legislative history of the Act clearly uses in-
surance as an example of one of those issues covered, that particular ar-
gument is hard to maintain. In other cases, however, the line might be
finer and certainly a number of investment and trade issues would be
very close to the line. Depending on whether the USTR interprets the
act narrowly or broadly in those borderline cases, a petitioner may or
may not get the USTR to take jurisdiction over his particular issue under
section 301.
B. Dispute Settlement
Because of some ambiguity in the law, a question remains as to
when and to what degree international conciliation, consultation, and
dispute settlement must be entered into by the United States when an
investigation is initiated under section 301. When the allegations con-
cern matters falling within trade agreements, there must be "consulta-
tions" with the foreign government involved.' 28 While the law does not
state that these consultations must be under the auspices of the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism, that is a valid interpretation. Depending
upon the USTR interpretation of that statute, cases could either quite
quickly or more slowly get into the international formal dispute. settle-
ment forum. Tactically, for a petitioner's interests, each case will be dif-
126 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 237, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 622.
At the suggestion of the then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Russell
Long of Louisiana, the committee included another clarifying provision to assure that the provi-
sion of subsidies on the construction of vessels used in the commercial transportation of goods by
water between the United States and foreign countries is within the purview of section 301.
This provision was added to provide some leverage to deal with what many have considered to
be a difficult problem of subsidization by foreign countries for the construction of merchant
seagoing vessels and the decline in the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Id. at 236, [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 622.
127 See Docket No. 301-20, note 100 supra, which was ultimately withdrawn by petitioner
after assurances were given by the Korean government that the problem would be solved. Early
in that case, some interests who did not want to pursue the case argued that the type of insur-
ance problem experienced by petitioner was not one involving international trade but was
rather an investment problem.
128 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (Supp. III 1979); see text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
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ferent depending upon the country involved and the issue. In some
cases, petitioner should push immediately for the formal dispute settle-
ment mechanism; in others, informal bilateral consultations might be the
best approach.
C Presidential Determinations and Responses
While the statute requires the President to determine what action, if
any, he will take under section 301 within twenty-one days of receiving a
recommendation from the USTR, 29 section 301 itself is quite broad as
to what action that may be. While he may take a specific action earlier
noted, 30 he shall, under 301 (a), take "all appropriate and feasible action
within his power to enforce. . .. -13' Frankly, that could mean a
number of things short of actual trade retaliation, including perhaps
more consultation. The drafters of the amended 301 did not intend that
the President be required to retaliate.1 32 At the same time, they did in-
tend that the law require some response in meritorious cases. ' 33 The de-
gree of response actually required is uncertain, and Presidents are more
likely to interpret the law liberally to allow more flexibility in responses.
For that reason, petitioner should not believe, for example, that a recom-
mendation for retaliatory action will actually result in a strong response
by the President.
X. Conclusion
Under the amended section 301, three cases have been initiated and
eight of the holdover cases from the old law have been terminated or
suspended. 134 Other cases have been filed under the new law but not
initiated, either because the issues were resolved before the time to initi-
ate elapsed (forty-five days)1 35 or the petitions did not contain sufficient
information on which the USTR could base a determination to initiate.
Three holdover cases from the unamended law are still pending and ac-
tive in the GATT dispute settlement process.13 6
It appears that much of the activity under the amended statute
129 Id § 2411(c)(2).
130OId § 2411 l(b).
'31 Id § 2411(a).
132 Se 1979 Senate Report, supra note 28, at 240, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
625-26.
133 Id
134 Cases terminated include Docket Nos. 301-3, note 24 supra; 301-5, note 23 supra; 301-7,
note 24 supra; 301-15, note 24 supra; 301-16, note 23 supra; and 301-17, note 22 supra. The two
marine insurance cases, Docket Nos. 301-14 and 301-18, note 24supra, have been suspended, the
Russian case pending an end to the trade embargo and the Argentine case pending agreed to
multilateral negotiations to be participated in by the Argentine government.
135 A case brought by Diamond Sunsweet concerning export of dried prunes to Venezuela"
and a case brought by the Rice Millers Association concerning rice exports to Japan.
136 See Docket Nos. 301-6, note 23 supra; 301-11, note 23 supra; and 301-13, note 22 supra.
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might be non-public or prior to actual filings. There is a danger, how-
ever, that the lack of activity in section 301 might be misinterpreted.
The success of section 301 might best be judged by how little it is
used rather than by how much it is used, if in fact the U.S. Government
uses the potential of section 301 along with other tools to settle issues
adversely affecting U.S. exporters before they reach a confrontational
stage. Formal section 301 cases should only be brought when the matter
of concern to potential petitioners cannot be solved by less confronta-
tional methods and in a timely manner.
The key, then, is for U.S. policy makers and for U.S. private inter-
ests adversely affected by the foreign trade practices covered by section
301 to know how best to utilize the statute. To some extent, use of 301 as
a tool both to avoid a formal filing or, if filed, to achieve a satisfactory
result, will vary greatly from case to case. The flexibility and "political"
element in 301 is much greater than in other trade statutes and for that
reason can be both more effective or less effective depending on how each
case is handled and responded to by all parties involved in the dispute.
It is important, however, that section 301 not be avoided or ignored.
It was quite clearly the intention of Congress that the United States more
effectively and vigorously enforce U.S. rights under international agree-
ments and to insure that U.S. exporters of both goods and services be
given opportunities to compete in foreign commerce. Neglecting to pur-
sue the use of section 301 to achieve those goals would send the wrong
signal to foreign governments, to U.S. interests, and to the Congress.

